

**“Squaring the Circle”:
Cooperative Security and
Military Operations**

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to publish this forty-fifth volume in the *Occasional Paper* series of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). We consider this to be an important paper for at least three reasons. First, it provides a pointed overview of conventional arms controls. So much of the focus in arms control literature is exclusively on strategic agreements that this important arena is overlooked. Second, this paper addresses the interaction effects of multiple arms control agreements. These second order consequences—often unforeseen and potentially negative—raise a warning flag for future multilateral and theater arms control and cooperative security efforts. Third, and closely related, the paper highlights the potential for the “offensive” use of arms control provisions by the full range of state parties to arms control agreements. Agreements are negotiated with a particular target state or group of states in mind and toward the bounding or control of specific behaviors and capabilities. Seldom do we really consider the second and subsequent order potential in compliance and verification monitoring that are highlighted here. Such indirect consequences clearly must be anticipated today and factored into a whole range of national security planning.

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JAMES M. SMITH
Director

“SQUARING THE CIRCLE”: COOPERATIVE SECURITY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper examines the real and potential tensions that exist between military operations and existing arms control agreements. It focuses on conventional arms control since military operations during hostilities is where limitations have potentially the greatest effect. This focus on conventional arms control further implies that the agreements examined are primarily (though not exclusively) those relating to possible operations in Europe or originating from there since the majority of the existing agreements apply to the European theater. Finally, the paper is presented from the perspective of the United States. Arms control and military operations are both addressed as “means” to accomplish American strategic objectives or “ends.”

The study consists of three areas. First, it summarizes existing agreements, the limitations they place on military operations, instances where these restrictions affect operations, and possible issues with respect to each treaty in the future. Second, it discusses in detail how arms control inspections affected military operations in Kosovo during and after the conflict. This includes a review of the inspections/observations that occurred in Italy, Macedonia, and Albania during the crisis as well as arms control efforts within Kosovo itself and subsequently in Macedonia. Finally, the study draws conclusions and makes six recommendations for the future.

- Arms control expertise must be more widely available, both in NATO and nationally, to ensure that such expertise can be deployed at all levels of military command.
- Advance generic planning should be undertaken by the US and all NATO allies to shorten the political decision-making process and ensure appropriate and timely execution of Vienna Document activities relating to any unusual build-up of NATO forces during periods of increased tension or crisis.
- The application of arms control responsibilities should be included in the scenarios of command post and field training exercises.
- Compliance with arms control responsibilities needs higher visibility within the NATO and American military command.

- The Kosovo experience underscored the critical importance of JCS and OSD experts' participation in the interagency process.
- There is a greater need for immediate military advice and expertise at State, CIA, and the National Security Council in order to assess quickly the impact of arms control inspections on current and planned military operations. Furthermore, careful examination should be made of potential changes to existing agreements as well as the full impact of the implementation of new treaties that may enter into force.